Country Report: South Korea (October 2024)

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The recent US presidential debate revealed significant differences between candidates Trump and Harris on foreign policy. Trump proposed pressuring allies like South Korea for defense costs, while Harris emphasized NATO solidarity. This divergence raises concerns for South Korea, particularly if Trump wins, as he labeled it a “money machine” and suggested it should pay $10 billion annually for US troops. The changing dynamics in US-South Korea relations, alongside North Korea’s military activities and its partnership with Russia, highlight a critical phase leading up to the US elections and their implications for the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea recently unveiled its uranium enrichment facility, likely to leverage negotiations with the US, and reported sending special forces to Russia for military training, raising alarms about its collaboration amid the Ukraine conflict. Additionally, North Korea announced a “fortification project” against South Korea and accused it of drone incursions, further escalating tensions. Efforts to improve South Korea-Japan relations were noted during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit, though criticisms about concessions from South Korea persisted.

2024 US presidential election and South Korea’s perspective

On September 10, in a TV debate hosted by ABC, the two candidates, Trump and Harris, had a heated discussion, revealing a clear difference in their views on foreign affairs and security issues. Trump indicated he would pressure America’s allies and friends to collect the costs, considering their interests. He also expressed his intention to prevent war by managing relationships with leaders of the authoritarian camp. Harris, who values solidarity, described NATO as the most important military alliance in the world and criticized Trump for being manipulated by dictators. Although the two candidates did not share in-depth opinions on issues on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea, they reaffirmed their differences in approaches and perceptions toward North Korea.

The conservative Hankook Kyungjae mentioned a big difference in the two parties’ perceptions of the alliance. The Democratic Party defined South Korea as a valuable ally, but the Republican Party emphasized the alliance’s obligation to invest in common defense without mentioning South Korea. The newspaper editorialized that it will be more difficult to deal with Trump if he takes office.

The centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo said that as the first topic of the presidential candidate TV debate was economic issues, the two candidates showed that they would put the United States and its financial interests first. For example, Harris emphasized that she is the only person with a plan that can help the American middle class and workers. In contrast, Trump emphasized that prices are higher because of countries such as China that have benefited economically from us for years. The newspaper warned that US protectionism targeting China will become more severe. 



As can be seen from the table above, the current presidential candidates have very different perspectives on alliance relations. South Korea, one of the important allies in the region, has no choice but to monitor this situation. Trump’s interview with the Economic Club on October 15 again demonstrated the Republican Party’s view on alliances. He called South Korea a “money machine” and said that if he were president, it would be paying $10 billion every year for stationing US troops. Regarding the recently concluded special agreement between South Korea and the United States on defense cost sharing, he said “If I were president, they would be paying $10 billion a year and they are willing to do that.”

The centrist newspaper Seoul Shinmun editorialized that while the 12th Defense Cost Sharing Agreement has been signed, Trump’s remark suggests the possibility of overturning it when he returns to power. It was concerned about the possibility of this risk becoming a reality.  Likewise, the centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo expressed regret that candidate Trump, who is predicted to have a chance of winning the US presidential election, disparages allies based on incorrect information. It added that even if his remarks were aimed at domestic voters, they were unreasonable under international law as well as common sense.

North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility unveiled for the first time

On September 13, North Korea unveiled its facility for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the first time. In 2010, North Korea invited American nuclear physicist Dr. Siegfried Hacker to the facility at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Other than that, North Korea does not disclose or allow access to any of its uranium enrichment facilities. This kind of disclosure can be seen as quite unusual. Since it is less than two months until the US presidential election, it can be interpreted as a ploy to raise the ransom in future negotiations. Rodong Shinmun and Korean Central News Agency (KNCA) first revealed the HEU facility to the public through Kim Jong-un’s public activities. They also released photos of him touring a room filled with centrifuges, reported that he -un provided on-site guidance to nuclear weapons research centers and ordered them to focus all their efforts on producing weapons-grade nuclear materials and achieve remarkable results.

The KCNA stated, “When Kim went around the site, he said that just seeing the facility energizes him.” In response, Koo Byoung-sam, spokesperson at the Ministry of Unification, said South Korea’s government strongly condemns North Korea for disclosing its uranium enrichment facilities, emphasizing that North Korea’s illegal development of nuclear weapons is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions. He also added that North Korea’s behavior is a serious threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula; therefore, North Korea must recognize that South Korea and the international community will never tolerate North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The conservative JoongAng Ilbo expressed deep concern the unusual disclosure, saying that appears to be aimed at pressuring the next US administration. As the existential threat of North Korean nuclear weapons draws closer, it is time for South Korea’s government to read North Korea’s intentions and prepare detailed countermeasures accurately, it added. It found worrisome the atmosphere of condoning or neglecting North Korea’s denuclearization, noting ahead of the presidential election, both the Democratic and Republican parties deleted the term North Korea’s denuclearization from their party platforms for the first time in four years. JoongAng Ilbo criticized the fact that the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters, which had been in charge of denuclearization negotiations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was suddenly abolished in May of last year, and the frequent replacements on the diplomatic and security sides of the President’s Office were also causing anxiety.

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun echoed this view, saying North Korea’s intention in revealing this facility was to show off that it has now become irreversibly nuclear-armed. It appears to be an attempt to highlight the Biden administration’s policy failures by showing the mass production of nuclear weapons despite sanctions. It raised questions about how to deal with North Korea, and in response, said it was necessary to reexamine the policy Korea to turn the situation around while continuing ROK-US extended deterrence cooperation. In other words, there is no choice but to carry out dialogue in addition to military and diplomatic pressure factors, and South Korea must avoid a rigid approach that insists only on denuclearization negotiations and denies all other dialogue with North Korea.

Interview with Yang Uk: North Korea’s continued message to South Korea

A lot happened during October, such as North Korea’s declaration of fortifications, Kim Yo-jong’s disparagement of the Armed Forces Day celebration, and the drone issue. The Asan Forum interviewed Yang Uk, a defense strategy expert and research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies to help gain an in-depth understanding of this situation. He called these steps “North Korea’s continued message to South Korea” rather than direct military provocations. Yang added that the reason why North Korea sent so many messages to South Korea is due to President Yoon’s mention of the end of the North Korean regime at the Armed Forces Day event on October 1 and the backlash against the disclosure of the Hyunmoo-5 missile.

North Korea’s fortification project against South Korea

On October 9, North Korea announced that it would embark on a “fortification project” to cut off roads and rail links to South Korea and construct front-line defense structures. This means that North Korea declared a “permanent blockade” of the southern border through fortifications around the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The North Korean People’s Army General Staff added “Our military sent a telephone notice to the US military to prevent misunderstandings and accidental clashes” and disclosed the date and time of the notification. The United Nations Command confirmed receiving North Korea’s notification through the hotline, a sign North Korea is ignoring South Korea but is open to dialogue with the US. The conservative JoongAng Ilbo noted that North Korea demolished the Gyeongui Rail line and the East-West Road, the railway in the first half of the year, but took military measures at the same time while making this official. These measures were seen as a follow-up to Kim Jong-un’s claim that South Korea is the “number one enemy” and that inter-Korean relations are “hostile.”

The conservative Dong-A Ilbo noted that military tensions are likely to increase due to North Korea’s offensive operations. It added that North Korea placed responsibility for this measure on South Korea and commented that North Korea had only notified the US to prevent accidental collisions due to misjudgment. The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun expressed concern about this issue by focusing on North Korea only notifying the US military of this fact because it means that when North Korea discusses the Korean Peninsula issue in the future, North Korea will only try to deal with the US, not South Korea.

Controversary over North Korea’s drone claim

On October 11, North Korea’s foreign ministry claimed that South Korea sent an Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) three times (3rd, 9th, and 10th) into Pyongyang’s airspace. On the 12th, Kim Yo-jong, sister of Kim Jong-un, announced through the KCNA that a terrible disaster would occur if South Korean drones were discovered again in Pyongyang. In response to this on the 13th, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense responded, “If anything is done to South Korea’s people, the North Korean regime will end that day.” The conservative Chosun Ilbo criticized North Korea’s claim that South Korea infiltrated unmanned aerial vehicles into Pyongyang’s skies and distributed anti-North Korean leaflets. This is because North Korea has violated South Korea’s airspace for over 10 years, as has been confirmed more than 10 times. It editorialized that despite such clear evidence, it is questionable whether North Korea, which refuses to take responsibility, has the right to criticize South Korea. The conservative Segye Ilbo also criticized North Korea’s attitude as hostile, and at the same time expressed concern about the possibility of provocations such as a seventh nuclear test or local warfare around the US presidential election in November. Itemphasized that our military must maintain a tight alert posture while also managing crises to prevent unnecessary accidental clashes.

The progressive Hankyeoreh called for mutual restraint between South and North Korea. It added that North Korea must stop sending garbage balloons and making threats against South Korea, and the South Korean government must immediately stop the distribution of leaflets against North Korea by private organizations. The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun commented that the South Korean government’s ambiguous attitude does not reassure the people and that if we are not going to war, drawing a clear line here would be beneficial to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Although some citizens and politicians are calling for a strong response to North Korea’s trash balloons, this is not the voice of the majority of citizens, and the vast majority of North and South Koreans do not want war to break out again in this land.

North Korea’s Military Support to Russia

From the 8th to the 13th, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), South Korea’s spy agency, detected North Korean special forces being transported to Russia via a Russian naval transport ship. North Korean soldiers dispatched to Russia have been distributed to Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, and Khabarovsk, are currently stationed at Russian military bases, and are expected to be deployed to the front line as soon as training is completed. The NIS explained that the North Korean soldiers received fake ID cards from residents of some areas of Siberia who have similar appearances and that they appeared to have disguised themselves as Russian soldiers to hide the fact that they were sent to the battlefield. It released a photo of a suspected North Korean soldier active on the Ukrainian front and said that this person was confirmed to be a North Korean missile technician who accompanied Kim Jong-un when he visited a tactical missile production plant in August of last year. The NIS, which obtained the photo in cooperation with the Ukrainian intelligence agency, applied Artificial Intelligence (AI) facial recognition technology to confirm that the face was the same as the reported technician.

Regarding this situation, Yang explained that North Korea had dispatched troops several times to accumulate experience in modern warfare. Specifically, he highlighted that North Korea dispatched fighter pilots during the Vietnam War and sent fighter pilots to Egypt during the Fourth Middle East War. He added that North Korea is sending troops not only for war experience but also for the benefits of diplomatic cooperation and military-technical support.

South Korea’s major news media outlets expressed deep concern about North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia. The conservative JoongAng Ilbo condemned North Korea’s decision to send not only weapons such as ballistic missiles but also many troops to the front lines as an illegal act of war in violation of international law. It also expressed deep concern that North Korea could increase its provocation capabilities by gaining experience in full-scale modern warfare after the Korean War. The centrist newspaper Seoul Shinmun said that this deployment is based on a treaty signed with Russia last June that stipulates mutual military support. Therefore, this deployment will not only transfer Russian technology for nuclear and missile advancement, but may lead to the participation of the Russian military in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly,the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun expressed concern that Russia may intervene in Korean Peninsula issues in the future and mentioned that the peninsula could see a confrontation between South Korea-United States and North Korea-Russia.

Efforts by leaders of both countries to improve South Korea-Japan relations

Activities to improve relations between the two countries intensified in September. Two main points of note are: (1) Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to South Korea; and (2) Japan’s transmission of the Ukishima Maru ship’s boarding list of Korean passengers in a controversial 1945 August explosion. Kishida, who was about to step down as prime minister, made his final visit to South Korea on September 6-7. Yoon and Kishida agreed to strengthen cooperation between the two countries and the US, South Korea, and Japan in response to North Korea’s provocations and North Korean-Russian closeness. Also, the two leaders unveiled various cooperative plans, including signing a memorandum of cooperation on the protection of overseas nations in third countries, for the emergency evacuation of their citizens from third countries. They actively discussed introducing a system where nationals of both countries would undergo pre-entry screening at their respective airports when visiting the other country.

The two leaders highly praised each other’s efforts to improve South Korea-Japan relations and pledged to continue cooperation. Kishida mentioned that since Yoon made a major decision to improve South Korea-Japan relations in March of last year, collaboration between the two countries has expanded significantly and that although there are still difficult issues between the two, they should resolve them one by one with a forward-looking attitude. Yoon responded that based on the trust between the two leaders, relations between the two countries have greatly improved over the past year. Two days before the prime minister visited South Korea, the Japanese government announced that it would hand over to South Korea the list of Koreans who died in the Ukishima ship explosion in 1945.

Immediately after liberation, the Ukishima was used by Koreans who had been forcibly conscripted into Japan to return to their homeland. However, the ship, which departed from Aomori Prefecture and was heading to Korea, suddenly sank with an explosion off the coast of Kyoto. After the incident, the Japanese government announced that the ship sank after colliding with a US submarine mine. At the time, Japan announced that the Ukishima ship hit an underwater mine and sank, killing 524 of the 3,700 people on board, however, the bereaved families claimed that Japan intentionally blew up the boat and that more than 3,000 of the 7,500 to 8,000 people on board died. The Japanese government, which had not accepted continued requests for a list from Korean bereaved families, announced its intention to hand a partial list over two days before Kishida visited South Korea. The Citizen’s Association for Forced Mobilization under Japanese Occupation, NGO, criticized Japan’s decision saying it was not something to make a fuss about as if Japan had done them a great favor. It emphasized that this issue is not an achievement of improving Korea-Japan relations, but that the Yoon Suk-yeol government should address this on the formal agenda in terms of diplomatic protection rights for its citizens. In addition, it called for strong requests to the Japanese government to investigate the truth, provide legal compensation, apologize, and take measures to restore the reputation of the victims, as a sign of improving relations between South Korea and Japan.

Kishida, who stopped short of repeating the Japanese government’s existing position, ended his trip to South Korea by saying that he was “heartbroken” on the issue of forced mobilization.

The conservative Kookmin Ilbo mentioned that Kishida’s would be a good opportunity to reaffirm the relationship between the two countries, which has become much stronger, and to ensure that the trend of cooperation will continue with the next prime minister. At the same time, it argued that the improvement in relations was because the South Korean government made too many concessions to Japan, including the forced mobilization solution, which is opposed by victims, the conflict surrounding Line-Yahoo, and the quiet stance on registering the Sado Mine as a World Cultural Heritage site. Whenever criticism is raised about these issues, the Yoon government has said, “What is important is Japan’s heart” and “There will be a sincere response from Japan,” but the majority of the public opinion finds no sincere heart or response from Japan. The conservative Kookmin Ilbo emphasized that considering public opinion Kishida needs to reveal a more sincere apology and reflect on past events during his visit to South Korea. The centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo editorialized that Yoon has always emphasized the importance of South Korea-Japan relations since his inauguration, and Kishida responded favorably to Yoon’s concessions. It added that Yoon has consistently maintained low-profile diplomacy on major issues in South Korea-Japan relations under the pretext of improving relations. It editorialized that if Kishida regards the improvement in relations as a true achievement, he must demonstrate a forward-looking attitude that South Korea can accept, including on issues related to history, at this meeting.

Yoon must also accept reasonable demands, such as implementation of follow-up measures related to the registration of the Sado Mine. As to Japan’s decision to hand over a partial list of Koreans who died in the Ukishima ship explosion in 1945 to South Korea, the centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo noted that the issue, which had been unresolved for a long time, took place just before outgoing Kishida s final visit to South Korea and the leader emphasized that cooperation between South Korea and Japan should continue. To achieve this, the newspaper emphasized that both countries must first be able to acknowledge the facts as they are and that this summit should not be a farewell, but a starting line for a new South Korea-Japan leadership, including the investigation of the truth about the Ukishima ship explosion.

The progressive Hankyoreh commented that the two leaders’ efforts were meaningful achievements, but did not meet South Korea’s expectations. Moreover, it noted that Kishida, who gave up running for another term, is trying to show off that he has achieved dramatic improvement in South Korea-Japan relations. It said that the reason why South Korea-Japan relations were able to develop despite going through many twists and turns was because Japan maintained the spirit of the Murayama statement and the South Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration, and that Kishida’s retirement left no room for his further reflection. Therefore, it would be difficult to expect additional recognition on history issues.



1. “돈의 논리로 국제문제 본 트럼프···한반도 안보관도 우려,” Chosun Ilbo, September 12, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/international/us/2024/09/12/CYUPWSU4FZDYPBXTHV676G2SD4/

2. “해리스 “독재자들, 트럼프 조종” vs 트럼프 ‘北中,날 두려워해’ (종합),” Yonhap News, September 11, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240911079151071

3. “트럼프 집권 시 한국 안보가 불안한 이유 재확인한 美 TV 토론,” Hankook Kyungjae, September 11, 2024, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2024091131841 b

4. “경제·안보 미국 우선주의 재확인한 해리스-트럼프 대선 토론,” Hankook Ilbo, September 12, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024091115140002682

5. “트럼프 “한국은 ‘머니머신’…내가 대통령이었으면 100억달러 받을 것,” Hankyoreh,October 16, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/america/1162753.html

6. “ ‘한국은 머니 머신’…눈앞에 닥친 ‘트럼프 리스크,’”Seoul Shinmun, October 17, 2024, https://seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/10/17/20241017035005 

7. “ ‘한국은 머니머신…’ 더 강해지는 트럼프의 억지,” Hankook Ilbo, October 17, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024101611150003112

8. “김정은 ‘보기만 해도 힘이 난다’…북, 우라늄 농축시설 첫 공개,” Hankyoreh,September 13, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1158361.html

9. “[주간북한동향] 제1743호 (2024.9.14.-2024.9.20.),” North Korea Information Portal, Ministry of Unification, September 27, 2024, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/report/view.do

10. “北 우라늄 농축시설 첫 공개…김정은 속내는 [포착],” Kookmin Ilbo, September 13, 2024, https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0020524067&code=61111611&cp=nv

11. “[주간북한동향] 제1743호 (2024.9.14.-2024.9.20.),” North Korea Information Portal, Ministry of Unification, September 27, 2024, https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/report/view.do

12. “[통일부 정례브리핑] 2024년 9월 13일,” Uni TV, Ministry of Unification, September 13, 2024, https://unitv.unikorea.go.kr/unitv/web/vod/view.do?id=7644&aid=79

13. “핵무기 시설 공개로 국제사회 협박한 북한,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 14, 2024, https://unitv.unikorea.go.kr/unitv/web/vod/view.do?id=7644&aid=79https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25277969

14. “북한 우라늄 농축 시설 공개, 대북정책 ‘새판짜기’ 불가피,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 18, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202409181815001

15. “‘지금 교전 중’ 김정은 말대로, 도로 끊은 북···DMZ가 수상하다 [view],” JoongAng Ilbo, October 10, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25283204

16. “한국은 무시, 미국엔 대화 여지···북한 ‘통미봉남’ 전술,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 10, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25283135

17. “‘지금 교전 중’ 김정은 말대로, 도로 끊은 북···DMZ가 수상하다 [view],” JoongAng Ilbo, October 10, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25283204

18. “ 北 ‘대남 영구 단절 요새화’…긴장 고조 노린 도발 대비해야,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 10, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20241009/130185781/2

19. “북한 ‘남쪽 국경 요새화’ 도 미국에만 통보했다니,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 10, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202410101825001

20. “‘무인기 평양 침투’ 로 더 거칠어진 남과 북… ‘다시 오면 참변’ 대 ‘오물풍선부터 중단해야,’” Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 13, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/defense-diplomacy/article/202410132049005 

21. “국방부 ‘국민안전에 위해 가하면 그날 북한 정권 종말,’” MBC news, October 13, 2024, https://imnews.imbc.com/news/2024/politics/article/6645661_36431.html

22. “北 ‘평양드론’ 주장하며 위협, 자신들은 10년간 드론 도발,” Chosun Ilbo, October 14, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2024/10/14/TGAD32LC2VBWXN4PPQYC44DXYE/

23. “‘무인기 또 침투 땐 끔찍한 참변’ 겁박한 北의 적반하장,” Segye Ilbo, October 13, 2024, https://segye.com/newsView/20241013513522

24. “‘평양 상공 무인기’ 공방으로 위태로운 남북, 상호 절제해야,” Hankyoreh, October 13, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1162299.html

25. Ibid.

26. “국정원 ‘北특수부대 블라디보스토크行…러 위조신분증도 소지,’” Dong-A Ilbo, October 18, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20241018/130247201/2

27. “북한군, ‘위조신분증‘ 받고 러시아군에 배치···감시위성으로 잡아내,” News1, October 18, 2024, https://www.news1.kr/nk/military/5573180

28. “ ‘AI안면인식’ 돌려보니···김정은 옆 군인, 우크라 전장에 있더라,” Yonhap News, October 18, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241018149551504

29. “국제안보 질서 뒤흔드는 북한의 러 파병 도발,” JoongAng Ilbo, October 19, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25285374

30. “北 러 파병에 급변한 안보지형…철저 대응해야,” Seoul Shinmun, October 20, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/10/21/20241021031006

31. “‘북한군 러 파병’ 이 불러올 한반도 안보 불씨 직시해야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 20, 2024,  https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202410201922001

32. “한일, 제3국서 국민 철수 때 서로 돕기로···재외국민보호각서 체결,” Chosun Biz, September 6, 2024, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/president_office/2024/09/06/5NCLVUNQSVH4VPYD5HS425TCCA/

33. “일본 입국 간편해진다…韓日, 상대국 공항서 사전 심사 추진,” Chosun Ilbo, September 6, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/politics/politics_general/2024/09/06/QOVB5CSR55F25BQ62ZWKXYUDDE/?utm_source=naver&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=naver-news

34. “다양한 협력 구상 내놓은 한일 정상…’역사문제‘ 새 언급 없어,” Joongang Ilbo, September 8, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25276361

35. “1945년 침몰 징용귀환선 日, 우키시마호 명단 제공,” Maeil Kyungjae, September 5, 2024, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/11110909

36. “한국인 징용자들을 희생시킨 우키시마호 침몰 사건,” The Independence Hall of Korea, January 2018, https://www.i815.or.kr/upload/kr/magazine/magazine/13/post-131.html

37. “韓 ‘한국인 수천명 희생 우키시마호 승선 명부 달라’ 日에 요청,” Hankook Kyungjae, June 22, 2024, https://www.hankyung.com/article/202406224313Y 

38. “[성명서] 79년 만의 승선자 명부 제공이 한일 관계 개선 성과인 양 호들갑 떨 일인가! (240906),” The Citizen’s Association for Forced Mobilization under Japanese Occupation, September 6, 2024, http://gjdwvstory.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=b02&wr_id=124

39. “기시다 방한, 과거사 문제·미래지향적 관계 다 진전 있길,” Kookmin Ilbo, September 6, 2024, https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=1725522628

40. “윤-기시다 고별회담, 브로맨스 과시로 끝나선 안 된다,” Hankook Ilbo, September 6, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024090511090003945

41. “징용 한국인 귀국선 침몰, 한일 함께 진상 규명해야,” Hankook Ilbo, September 7, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024090615200001311

42. “기시다 총리 퇴임 직전 ‘빈손 방문’, 국민 동의 없는 외교 지속가능하지 않다,” Hankyoreh,September 6, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1157406.html

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