EMAIL 
LIST 
In late 2024, Chinese analysts proposed that Chinese symbiosis theory and the Belt and Road Initiative can help the “Global South” overcome factors that hinder its collective rise, positioning China not just as a member of the “Global South” but as its leader. They evaluated differences in the policy choices made by China, India, and Brazil regarding the WTO policy of special and differential treatment for developing countries, tracing this variation to the interplay of identity and interest. Turning to China’s relations with ASEAN, they predicted that relations would improve overall, but recognized that weaknesses in some bilateral relations would persist, particularly with respect to the Philippines. They sharply criticized Japan’s policy toward Taiwan, arguing that Japan has followed the US policy of “using Taiwan to contain China” to advance its perceived strategic interests, in alignment with its new more assertive national security policy. Finally, they evaluated the implications of AUKUS Pillar Two for Chinese interests.
China’s Role in the “Global South”
In Taipingyang Xuebao, 2024, no. 10, Liu Yang and Li Yibin argue that international symbiosis theory (guoji gongsheng lilun)—and its practical manifestation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—can provide the basis for the collective rise of the “Global South.” Faced with a West determined to maintain its hegemony, Liu and Li contend, China can play a central role in leading the successful political and economic rise of the Global South.
Liu and Li assert that the rise of the Global South faces a three-part dilemma: theoretical, institutional, and developmental. The theoretical dilemma arises from the dominance of Western perspectives in international relations theory and international development theory, which privilege Western ways of understanding the global order and defining “successful” modernization. The institutional dilemma refers to the continued power of the “Global North” in international institutions, which perpetuates its influence over the international order and marginalizes the Global South’s ability to set the international agenda or shape global norms. The development dilemma refers to widening inequality between the “Global North” and the “Global South,” typified by their different positions in global value chains.
Liu and Li argue that the dilemma of the Global South has both theoretical and practical origins. At the theoretical level, the dilemma emerges from the “Western myth,” which, they contend, traffics in “confrontation” and “conflict,” rather than the peace and development promoted by members of the Global South. The Western determination to hold onto its power leads it to perceive any opposition to the existing hegemonic order—particularly from China—as a threat, resulting in efforts to contain rising powers. At the practical level, the dilemma of the Global South emerges from “internal” challenges, such as weak infrastructure and low levels of development, and from “external” challenges, such as Western efforts to fracture the collective identity of the Global South and woo members of the Global South to its side. Liu and Li particularly criticize the United States for positioning India and China as competitors for the leadership of the Global South, while also undermining China’s position as a member of the Global South in the first place.
Championing China’s “natural” membership in the Global South, Liu and Li argue that international symbiosis theory, a Chinese approach to International Relations, can overcome the “Western myth” that provides the theoretical origins of the Global South’s dilemma. Symbiotic theory emphasizes “coexistence and harmony” (rather than “confrontation and conflict”) among different entities; it envisions a multipolar world order composed of sovereign equals, promotes “mutually beneficial multilateralism” (rather than seeing economic interconnectedness as a potential vulnerability), and respects different countries’ understandings of their own development needs. This approach, Liu and Li believe, provides theoretical legitimacy for the rise of the Global South. At the same time, Liu and Li assert, China’s BRI offers a practical solution to the internal and external challenges that the Global South faces: it strengthens their institutional power by enhancing their ability to work with each other and with outside institutions to create a more inclusive economic order and spurs equitable and inclusive development by providing an opportunity for countries to “co-construct” their own development in ways that do not require them to abide by Western standards or remain at the lower rungs of global value chains. Liu and Li conclude that China can uniquely solve the dilemmas that the Global South faces in its efforts to collectively rise.
Throughout their analysis, Liu and Li define the interests of the Global South in a way that aligns with China’s long-standing discourse, including slogans such as “community of common destiny” and “peaceful development,” while also, given the repeated discussion of the collective rise of the Global South, harkening back to the Hu-era slogan of a “peaceful rise.” This definition of the Global South’s interests serves to justify China’s position as a member of the Global South and assert the legitimacy of its leadership of the Global South at a time when China might no longer be considered an “emerging economy” or “developing country.” Despite Liu and Li’s clear assertion that China is a “natural member [chengyuan] of the ‘Global South,’” there is some slippage in their language—they also describe China as a “natural ally [tongmeng jun] of the ‘Global South’” and describe the BRI as an opportunity for cooperation between China and the countries of the Global South, both of which suggest the Global South exists independently of China. Overall, Liu and Li’s analysis gives the impression of an attempt to define the Global South in Chinese terms while positioning China as its savior.
The Role of Identity and Interests in the BRICS Countries’ Policy Choices
In Eluosi Yanjiu, 2024, no. 5, Zhu Jiejin and Liu Yingchen argue that the interplay of identities and interests explains the divergent policy choices made by China, India, and Brazil regarding whether to adhere to the WTO policy of special and differential treatment for developing countries. These provisions give developing countries special rights, such as longer implementation periods, and allow developed countries to apply more favorable terms to developing countries than to other WTO members.
China has partly adhered to special and differential treatment provisions, insisting that the provisions remain in effect while acting flexibly when it comes to their actual implementation with specific partners. Zhu and Liu trace this middle position to the interaction of China’s identity as a developing country and its interests in an open economy. Consistent with Liu and Li’s argument that China is a member of the Global South, Zhu and Liu highlight how China’s solidarity with developing countries has been a crucial aspect of its national identity since the founding of the PRC. China believes that its massive economic growth gives it an opportunity to give back to other developing countries by leading them toward shared prosperity and a more equitable global economic order, rather than catapulting China out of the ranks of the developing world. This identity leads China to promote the continuation of special and differential treatment. At the same time, however, China’s preferences are for open economic development. As China has begun to export capital and as its e-commerce sector has taken off, China’s interests have aligned with countries in the developed world that seek unified, transparent global rules. The contradictions between China’s identity and its interests have led it to adopt this mixed position.
By contrast, Zhu and Liu argue, India has stuck firmly to the policy of special and differential treatment for developing countries, arguing that all developing countries must maintain this right and seeking to strengthen its implementation, while often acting as a leader of developing countries in the WTO. Zhu and Liu contend that this position derives from the interaction of India’s identity as a developing country and its more protectionist interests. Like China, India has defined itself as a developing country since independence, with its current efforts to act as a leader of the Global South only the most recent manifestation of this longstanding identity. However, unlike China, India prefers a protectionist trade strategy. Despite economic liberalization in the twenty-first century, India remains reluctant to fully open up its domestic market to global competition and seeks to protect its less competitive agriculture and e-commerce industries.
Brazil has adopted a third policy position, becoming the first of the BRICS members to abandon the policy of special and differential treatment for developing countries. This position emerges from Brazil’s identity as a regional power, rather than a developing country, and its interest in an open economy. Zhu and Liu argue that Brazil’s identity as part of the Global South has long been weak, with its elites identifying more with the West and its leaders prioritizing close connections with the United States. Though some Brazilian presidential administrations have sought to position Brazil globally as a member of the developing world, Zhu and Liu assert that the more dominant tendency has been to promote an identity as a regional power. At the same time, Brazil seeks an open economy, promoting the liberalization of international trade and investment, and of agriculture in particular.
An important implication of their argument, Zhu and Liu conclude, is that a shared identity will not necessarily give rise to shared interests: China and India both identify as developing countries, but have different interests, and therefore different policy positions. Moreover, Zhu and Liu highlight a key distinction in the view of BRICS held by China and India compared to Brazil. While China and India views BRICS as a forum that allows developing countries to cooperate, Brazil views BRICS as a forum through which regional powers can influence global affairs. Zhu and Liu’s analysis highlights important differences between India and China, both of which are asserting leadership of the developing world. More broadly, Zhu and Liu’s analysis raises questions about the future of BRICS, particularly as its expansion leads it to encompass more heterogenous national identities and preferences.
China–ASEAN Relations
In Guoji Zhengzhi, 2024, no. 3, Fu Congcong and Lü Huiyi predict that China–ASEAN relations will face new challenges in 2024–2025 despite overall improvement. Overall, between mid-2023 and mid-2024, China–ASEAN relations were characterized by improving political and bilateral relations, extensive economic and trade relations, and growing cultural exchanges. According to survey research from the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, China is ASEAN’s most important strategic partner and source of economic influence. Furthermore, the survey finds that if forced to align with either China or the United States, a majority of respondents prefer China, a sharp reversal from 2023 that Fu and Lü attribute to the unpopularity of the US position on the Israel–Gaza conflict. (Nevertheless, it is important to note that the survey finds significant variation between countries like Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar that strongly prefer China and countries like Vietnam and the Philippines that strongly prefer the United States.) However, “local shocks” have emerged that worsen China’s relations with particular ASEAN member states, most notably related to China’s maritime disputes with the Philippines (which is increasing its military cooperation with the United States) and to conflict in Myanmar.
Fu and Lü predict that China–ASEAN relations will generally improve between fall 2024 and fall 2025. They highlight leaders’ interest in building political mutual trust through visits and active diplomacy; China’s growing economic influence (China is ASEAN’s top trade partner and promotes regional integration); and ASEAN countries’ desire to maintain stable relations with China to maintain economic security and domestic political legitimacy. Fu and Lü anticipate that China–Vietnam relations will improve substantially, continuing an existing trend, but acknowledge that they are starting from a weak place, with very low Vietnamese support for Chinese economic or political influence and particular Vietnamese concerns over China’s policies in the South China Sea and Lancang–Mekong River. Nevertheless, they anticipate greater exchange and expanded cooperation in areas such as defense and rail infrastructure and believe that maritime concerns can be contained. Likewise, Fu and Lü predict that China–Indonesia relations will continue to substantially improve, noting Indonesian elites’ improving perceptions of China and the likelihood that Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto will continue the China-friendly policies of Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, they anticipate that Singapore will continue to balance between China and the United States, improving its relations with China without picking sides.
Despite these generally positive expectations, Fu and Lü identify two challenges for China–ASEAN relations. The first is the US effort to persuade countries to “de-hedge”—in other words, to choose the United States instead of hedging between China and the United States. They charge that the US alliance strategy, its “securitization” of economic issues, and its efforts to “woo” countries through economic means have pushed countries to align with the United States. This is particularly notable in the Philippines, where President Bongbong Marcos has strengthened military cooperation with the United States, allowed the United States to open four military bases, and acted to check China through the trilateral US–Japan–Philippines maritime security mechanism. Fu and Lü anticipate the worsening of China–Philippines relations will continue, but do not expect it to spread to other countries.
The second challenge is the strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. On balance, the number of ASEAN respondents who are concerned by China’s economic and political influence substantially exceeds those who welcome it. These concerns tend to center around sovereignty and trade imbalances, among other issues. This lack of trust in China may impact ASEAN countries’ choices as China, the United States, and others jockey for influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Fu and Lü conclude that China–ASEAN relations will be significantly impacted by US–ASEAN relations, which, in turn, will be significantly influenced by the presidential transition in the United States. US investment in economic, military, and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asia grew significantly under the Biden administration. With Trump returning to office, ASEAN may take a “wait and see” approach to the United States, while continuing to improve its relations with China. (While the US Indo-Pacific strategy began under the first Trump administration, the Biden administration institutionalized the strategy through minilateral relations and by re-envisioning its regional alliances; given Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, how the United States will approach the Indo-Pacific in general and ASEAN in particular is now in question.) Although Fu and Lü expect China–ASEAN relations to improve overall, they recognize that China’s relations with specific ASEAN member states may diverge from this general trend.
Japan’s Taiwan Strategy
In Riben Xuekan, 2024, no. 5, Cai Liang assesses Japan’s policy of “using Taiwan to contain China,” which has weakened the bilateral China–Japan relationship, calling for new efforts to improve the bilateral relationship without compromising the “One China” policy. As US–China strategic tensions have intensified, both Japan and the United States have played the “Taiwan card.” Under the Biden administration, the United States embraced a wholly competitive view of China, which it positioned as a threat to the “free international order.” In this context, the United States promoted support for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan’s self-defense as a component of its Indo-Pacific strategy and its broader effort to contain China. China believes that the United States’ “One China Policy” has been hollowed out. Moreover, Cai argues, the United States has shifted from “playing the Taiwan card” to contain China to arming Taiwan so that it can become a “porcupine” that can withstand mainland efforts to forcibly reunify, or even play a “suicide” role in China–US strategic competition. To this end, Cai contends, the United States is pushing its allies to take the same position on Taiwan to jointly pressure China, reflecting both the Biden administration’s promotion of alliances and declining US power.
In this context, Cai argues, Japan has also adopted a policy of “using Taiwan to contain China.” Japan has its own reasons to support Taiwan, including its professed strategic interest in ensuring the security of the Taiwan Strait, but also views the US–Japan alliance as the foundation of its foreign policy and strongly supports the US-led regional and global order. Japan has long seen Taiwan as a likeminded member of the Western “camp.” Cai charges that Japan’s “Three Security Documents,” passed in 2022, exaggerate the threat posed by China and frame support for Taiwan as a way to balance against the mainland. Cai argues that this approach to Taiwan highlights both Japan’s willingness to follow the United States and its binary division of countries into those with values that align with Japan’s and those with values that do not. Cai contends that by portraying China’s insistence on unification as a violation of “regional peace and stability” and building support for Taiwan into its Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan justifies its interference in China’s internal affairs. This logic leads Japan to support Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (a political party which Cai, in line with the official PRC position, strongly opposes).
Cai asserts that Japan has distorted its political promises to the mainland to recognize Taiwan as part of the PRC by adopting language affirming the need for a “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan issue to counter mainland calls for “peaceful reunification.” In doing so, it portrays what China sees as its internal affairs as a nefarious effort to “unilaterally change the status quo.” Furthermore, Japan’s discussion of “Taiwan issues” position the mainland as a potential threat to regional peace and security. Japan justifies its intervention in the Taiwan issue by claiming “Taiwan is in trouble.” Cai charges that by “smearing” China, Japan (and the United States) seek to construct an “international public opinion deterrent.”
As Japan embraces the policy of “using Taiwan to contain China,” Cai claims, its communication channels with Taiwan are strengthening, even though Japan does not officially recognize Taiwan. Even after Japan switched official recognition to the mainland in 1972, it maintained economic and trade relations with Taiwan and established special communication channels to resolve bilateral challenges in the absence of official relations. In recent years, Cai contends, Japan has violated these understandings by pushing at red lines in official statements, upgrading its special communication channels to quasi-official status, and strengthening relations between Japanese and Taiwanese legislators.
At the same time, Cai asserts, Japan has integrated its Taiwan policy with the objectives of its new national security strategy. Both Japan and the United States oppose the forceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and Japan is willing to use military, economic, and diplomatic means to support the DPP in its efforts to deter such an attempt. From a military perspective, Japan has both strengthened its cooperation with the United States and other Western countries, linking the Taiwan Strait with the East and South China Seas, and enhanced its defense posture in the Ryukyu Islands. As Japan has gained more independence relative to the United States, its role has shifted from providing logistical support to US forces to supporting a potential US attack. From an economic perspective, Japan has cooperated with the United States to increase supply chain security and advance economic security; the opening of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s first Japanese semiconductor plant highlights Japan’s efforts to secure the semiconductor supply chain. From a diplomatic level, Japan has continued to promote its position on Taiwan in various bilateral and multilateral settings, asserting that Taiwan’s values align with those of the West and that China’s refusal to renounce the possibility of the use of force threatens regional and global peace. This approach aligns with Japan’s revamped national security strategy: Japan is asserting a more active regional role to shore up declining US relative power; advancing more diplomatic autonomy and taking more responsibility for its own defense; encouraging diversification of suppliers to reduce dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors, demonstrating its attention to economic security; and trying to increase its global influence.
Cai concludes that Japan views the Taiwan issue as a component of the long-term strategic competition between China and the United States and the split into democratic and authoritarian camps, while also seeing Japanese support for Taiwan as a way to contain China, which it portrays as a threat to peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Given the persistence of US–China competition, leadership changes in the United States or Japan will not change the fundamental nature of Japan’s policy toward China. As a result, mutual trust between China and Japan will continue to deteriorate and various aspects of the bilateral relationship will become securitized. Rather than adopting a reactive approach, Cai urges China to promote Chinese rights while also emphasizing regional stability. To this end, China should both clarify its red lines on Taiwan and promoting functional cooperation with Japan to promote a mutually beneficial relationship.
AUKUS Pillar Two
In Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 2024, no. 11, Hou Henan assesses the implications for China of AUKUS Pillar Two, which promotes the joint development of advanced capabilities among Australia, the UK, and the United States. Hou argues that Pillar 2 has three main characteristics. First, it represents a major government-directed effort to harness science in the service of national security objectives, like Cold War-era efforts, but with China replacing the Soviet Union as the main “existential threat.” Second, it promotes “integrated deterrence” and seeks to leverage a whole-of-government, whole-of-society, and multiple fields approach to contain China. Third, it builds a network of minilateral organizations to collectively deter China.
While AUKUS is officially aimed at promoting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Hou, like other Chinese observers, believes that it is aimed at China. To this end, Hou asserts that a key motivation for AUKUS Pillar Two is the United States’ desire to respond to the perceived threat from China caused by its economic, military, and technological rise, which has narrowed the power gap between China and the United States. Another important aspect of AUKUS Pillar Two, Hou argues, is the pursuit of “technological power” to reinforce US hegemony and the establishment of a secure technology supply chain. The UK’s alignment with the United States is consistent with its “Global Britain” strategy, while Australia’s alignment with the United States supports its pursuit of an “asymmetric advantage” and offers an opportunity to expand its defense capabilities and regional influence.
Despite the compatibility of the three countries’ strategic interests and institutional preferences and their shared cultural traditions, Hou argues that AUKUS faces some constraints. First, domestic support for AUKUS may waver with a change in leadership—most notably, the arrival of the second Trump administration in the United States. The expense of funding AUKUS may also undermine its domestic support. Second, export control policies might inhibit cooperation among the AUKUS members. Third, US “technological protectionism” might weaken its allies and create frictions between AUKUS and NATO. Finally, ASEAN countries may refuse US efforts to persuade them to choose sides and are generally wary of signs that the United States might attempt to replace ASEAN’s key regional role with new minilateral institutions.
Nevertheless, Hou concludes that an AUKUS+ model may emerge, with Canada and New Zealand as potential new members, and the United States also encouraging Japanese participation. At the same time, Hou predicts that the fields of cooperation may expand to encompass the Arctic and deep space, areas in which the three countries fear competition from China and Russia. Overall, Hou’s analysis highlights the scrutiny Chinese analysts apply to US minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.
SHARE