Introduction

The period 2021-2024 tested China more than any other period in the 21st century had. After a pandemic originating in China with no parallel in a century, Xi Jinping grew even more confident. When Russia launched a war with the most serious geopolitical implications since WWII, Xi put longstanding principles of sovereignty aside to echo Vladimir Putin’s grievances against the US-led security order and resist appeals to join in pressuring the aggressor. Xi proceeded to launch a series of initiatives to transform the global order, against US economic leadership, hostile to alliances, and insistent that invocation of human rights infringes on non-interference principles. In the face of unparalleled resistance led by Joe Biden, Xi pressed forward with greater vigor.

In 2013-16, China took the initiative; in 2017-20, China repulsed others pressing, one-by-one, to seize the initiative; and in 2021-24, China finally faced a full-blown alignment against its strategy, as it doubled down on constructing its own regional order despite formidable challenges. Cutting a deal with the United States—high on the agenda in 2013 and 2017—was now out of the question unless it meant US capitulation to a world big enough for two powers (a clear call for spheres of influence incompatible with the US alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific). Driving a wedge between the US and its allies no longer seemed feasible. China reinforced its closest partnerships, which was facilitated by Russia’s immersion in an unrestrained war to conquer Ukraine and North Korea’s retrenchment into autarchy coupled with newly provocative missile tests. Across much of Asia, polarization intensified, boosted by US defensiveness. The root cause of polarization was China’s decision not to seek common ground, as exemplified by the Xi-Biden summit on the sidelines of the 2023 San Francisco APEC summit, which China deemed a success easing economic transactions amid renewed diplomacy, but others saw as a missed opportunity.

In the spring of 2024, China had intensified diplomacy to drive a wedge between Washington and its allies. It embraced the late-May China-Japan-South Korea (CJK) summit in Seoul in pursuit of a three-way FTA and a new industrial supply chain, while refusing appeals to resume imports of Japanese marine products or address rising geopolitical tensions. Meanwhile, it was exploring overtures to European states to head off the US and Japanese push for NATO to take a stand on Asian security. Yet, all of this was for naught. The resistance to China’s aggressive behavior only further solidified. On the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea, Beijing stuck to its hardline course, rejecting the geopolitical status quo and echoing Moscow’s call for “indivisible security.” This stance rejected US-led alliances in favor of new security arrangements accommodating to spheres of influence, whether Russia’s in Europe or Sinocentrism across a vast swath of Asia.

Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Thinking toward the US Role in the Indo-Pacific, 2021-2024”

China had had high hopes for the Biden administration to “reverse” the wrong direction they saw from the Trump administration, but it underestimated the bipartisan consensus in Washington on China as well as the inertia of the changed direction under the Trump team. That direction was anchored on a firm conviction that China is a hostile competitor, or at a minimum, a strategic challenge, and that the engagement policy had failed. It took the Chinese two years to realize that to change this deeply embedded perception was near impossible.

Beijing could not wait to turn the page and restore some normalcy in bilateral relations. Compared to earlier discussions about what could be done to revive cooperation with the United States, the issues being put on the table were more forward-leaning and focused on the benefits of great power cooperation. Yet, relations during the first year of the Biden administration got off to a rather rocky start. In January, early signs of the administration’s tough attitude on China confirmed pessimistic suspicions about the prospects to the Chinese foreign policy community. The Chinese had hoped that the administration would demonstrate “more respect” and “more consideration” of China’s core national interests, especially Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, but in the Biden administration’s first days there was almost no good news.

2022 in many ways was a perfect storm. Domestically, China suffered the nationwide COVID lockdown and the popular discontent from it, held the 20th Party Congress in October, and suffered an economic slowdown. Externally, China was framed by Putin as an accomplice in the Russian war in Ukraine and after that had to deal with the collective wrath from the United States and Europe. It was named America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge” in Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February, and his National Security Strategy in October. Despite the diplomatic embarrassment of having been completed blindsided by Putin on the invasion, Beijing adopted its famous “Pro-Russia” neutrality in the war. It would not oppose Russia, and its silence indicated complacency, acquiescence, and de facto recognition of a fait accompli.

The anti-US rhetoric in China was escalating rapidly and vehemently as Beijing locked down its own people city after city. The inflammatory propaganda was particularly salient in the Foreign Ministry’s comments on the Ukraine crisis, accusing the United States of agitating tensions, supplying weapons to fuel the conflict, and unfairly holding China responsible for the crisis. China’s Foreign Ministry retorted that the United States had “no position to lecture China on sovereignty and territorial integrity” as it was “currently trampling over China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on Taiwan.” There was a clear tendency in China to whitewash and minimize Russia’s responsibility in the aggression and blame Ukraine and the United States for it instead.

Tension over the Taiwan Strait due to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan marked the most unstable period of Biden’s relationship with China to date. By July 2022, the top priority of the whole Chinese bureaucracy was blocking her visit to Taiwan. A good amount of saber rattling came from China, including Xi’s statement that “those who play with fire will perish by it.” Yet, the Chinese recognized that the Biden administration did make serious efforts to try to persuade her against the trip. This is why the personal sanctions only targeted Pelosi and her family. Reassuring for the Chinese was that the US reaction to the Chinese military exercises was very “moderate.” Many privately called it “a silver lining” from the Pelosi visit.

A key factor in China’s restraint in the visit was the fact that the 20th Party Congress was only two months away, and China was not going to risk a war with the United States before Xi’s critical event to secure his third term. But things did not improve for China at all after the 20th Party Congress. By the time that the 20th Party Congress concluded, China had been living under self-imposed isolation for almost 3 years. Especially in 2022, China’s economy suffered tremendously from the rampant and repeated lockdowns to eliminate COVID cases. The economy had always been the most prominent component of China’s comprehensive national power as well as the foundation of its confidence in the “rise of the East and the decline of the West” and “the rise of China and the decline of the United States.” Now that the economy was running into a significant slowdown, Beijing was forced to refocus its priorities back to the domestic and economic fronts.

The most direct impact of the prioritization of domestic economic and COVID challenges on for
2023 was more of a roller coaster ride than most had expected. The balloon incident, in which a high-altitude balloon from China transited US airspace without approval, was certainly a black swan event; it effectively delayed cabinet-level engagement for four months. The desire for Xi to visit San Francisco was the theme for Beijing from the beginning of 2023. Therefore, despite the ups and downs, that desire ensured the eventual stabilization of bilateral relations by year’s end.
Beijing had to seek a relatively stable external environment to enable its focus on domestic issues. There was a strong aversion to distraction, and to the potential that China could become exploitable by “foreign hostile forces.” Xi’s diplomatic charm offensive started right after the Party Congress.

The expectation was that Xi would attend the APEC summit, and Beijing was exploring the possibility of turning the trip into an official visit to the United States as well, which would require positive interaction between the two countries. This would be portrayed as the top Chinese leader’s major effort to improve the negative direction of bilateral relations. Chinese sensed a coordinated effort in the United States to build up pressure and leverage vis-à-vis China before Blinken’s trip. They speculated that the goal was to push China to make more concessions. While there had been complaints from the policy circle, especially from hawkish corners including the PLA, about these US efforts, the consensus remained that China needed to accommodate and keep a low profile because Xi’s priority in 2023 was focused on improving relations with the United States.

Both Balloongate, which delayed diplomacy, and events in and after the Munich Security Conference significantly dimmed, if not completely buried, the positive outlook for bilateral relations. Such events included: The US revelation in Munich of China’s plan to provide “lethal aid” to Russia in the Ukraine war, and the continuous, enhanced diplomatic pressure to deter China from providing such aid after that; and senior “official” engagement between the United States and Taiwan. By April, Chinese were no longer hanging onto the idea of forging a “basic framework of bilateral relations.” Yet, trips to Beijing by Blinken, Yellen, and Gina Raimondo from June to September reassured the Chinese of the US intent.

Looking at the overall shift of Chinese policy toward the US under Biden, the Chinese foreign policy community had become quite bipolar, swinging between mania and depression; that either there was “hope” or “no hope” for US-China relations, and such judgments were easily swayed by events and current affairs. Despite frequent Chinese solemn declarations in 2023 that “we bear no illusion about the United States,” by the end of July 2023, the Chinese were finally reengaging again. To prevent the “black swans and gray rhinos” had emerged as the top priority for Beijing, at least before Xi’s November trip.

After year-long speculation and many months of negotiations, the Biden-Xi summit finally took place in San Francisco. Instead of a sideline meeting at the APEC summit, the Chinese side emphasized that this was a standalone leadership summit. In fact, some Chinese insiders jokingly called the APEC summit a “side meeting” of the Biden-Xi summit. When people scrutinized the achievements in the government readouts, the list of tangible deliverables for China was surprisingly short. None of the Chinese priorities seemed to have made the list. On the issue of Taiwan and the issue of economic and trade policy, there were no breakthroughs. The stabilization of US-China relations was still important for the Chinese economy.

As Xi consolidated his control over the domestic politics at the 20th Party Congress, the next task on his agenda was to stabilize the relationship with the United States and to demonstrate that he had the ability to manage the United States and all its challenges. Some even regarded the trip to San Francisco and the broad stabilization of relations with the United States as Xi’s primary tasks in 2023. Regardless of the deliverables, his trip was portrayed as “unique” and “strategically consequential” in the recent history of U.S.-China relations

With the November election looming, no major leadership engagement was planned for 2024. And the Chinese have been watching the election closely as its result will determine the direction of bilateral relations. The train left the station long ago on which candidate China prefers: experts have publicly proclaimed that whoever the winner is, both candidates are “poison” for China. In their view, Biden could have brought more stability to bilateral relations, but his competition strategy had been quite effective economically and diplomatically, leaving China’s high-tech industry and diplomatic offensive in limbo. By comparison, Trump’s position on US alliances and partnerships and the damage he could cause serves Beijing’s strategic agenda in the long run. Yet in the short term, Trump’s unpredictability and his use of maximum pressure would put China in extremely difficult corners, making him the less desirable option. When Chinese looks back at the four years under Biden, they might realize that it was the last window of relative tranquility before the United States and China finally and formally embarked on a path of a new Cold War.

Gilbert Rozman, “How China Doubled Down on the Polarization of Northeast Asia, 2021-2024”

In the period 2021-2024, Chinese confidence reached unprecedented levels, showcased in the rapid succession of programs launched by General Secretary Xi Jinping to reshape the world as well as the regional order. Building on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) introduced in 2013, Xi proposed in rapid succession the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilizational Initiative. Each represented an unmistakable challenge to the US-led, liberal international order, opposing the “undemocratic” economic order, alliance-oriented security order, and intrusive values demands defined by Beijing as the unjust status quo. On the surface, these initiatives defended sovereignty, above all, but they embodied Sinocentric goals resistant to balancing or criticizing China, e.g., in China’s immediate backyard of Northeast Asia. The warnings about “stability” in 2024 conveyed the essence of China’s newly aroused thinking.

By 2024, Northeast Asia was polarized to a degree unseen since the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, an outcome China blamed on the US “Cold War mentality.” China protested that it only pursued regional integration, while driving polarization. Its strategy consisted of four maneuvers: (1) splitting others—all versus the United States, and Russia and South Korea versus Japan; (2) isolating Northeast Asia from the rest of the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan, and from Europe; (3) solidifying China’s hold over Russia as well as its unique leverage over North Korea; and (4) concealing Sinocentrism but championing national identity divides that left room for it, even as the overall national identity approach was faltering. If splitting others and isolating Northeast Asia were failing, China had more success in solidifying control in the region’s northern frontier. Together, its maneuvers—counterproductive or successful—led to deeper polarization.

Justifying Russia’s full-scale war in Europe as a result of US policies and blocking new UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea on the pretext that Pyongyang is driven to missile tests by Washington’s hostile policy, China took unprecedented steps in support of polarization in Northeast Asia in the first part of the 2020s. Castigating Joe Biden for the new “Cold War” atmosphere, Xi rejected US efforts to establish guard rails to manage competition without veering toward confrontation. Having lost hope in driving a wedge between the US and its allies in Japan and South Korea, China upped the pressure on the two, further reflecting its shift toward polarization despite economic urgency belying that path. Yet, the urgency of economic problems led to some softening of China’s posture by 2024, consistent with plans to flood markets with industrial products, requiring more customers in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. If polarization only partially served Sinocentrism, an economic pathway was a longshot to success.

Tensions over Northeast Asia came to a head in 2021 to 2024, intensifying year-by-year. Beijing rejected Biden’s foreign policy meant to push back through multilateralism but also to set a path toward stability. It severely criticized Kishida’s security focus, denying Japan’s right to turn away from its postwar passivity in an ominous environment. And it soured on Moon’s rebalance toward the United States even before castigating Yoon for going further, while responding to North Korea, Russia, and China’s aggressive inclinations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Taking a supportive attitude toward Putin’s war and giving sustenance to Kim Jong-un’s belligerence, Xi embraced polarization of Northeast Asia more forthrightly than over his prior eight years on top.

In 2021-22, the impact of polarizing forces could be obscured through denials of Biden’s success.
The obligatory note of optimism in analyses of Northeast Asia posited no less than four factors that could mitigate US-led alliance triangulation. First, the legacy of ROK-Japanese distrust lingers over territorial and history issues. Second, threat perceptions and strategic interests differ. Third, economic interests are at odds, fueled by US protectionism. Fourth, domestic politics could interfere. Despite reservations, Chinese warned that polarization is intensifying in Northeast Asia with no hint of China’s responsibility or need to change course. Realism was not in evidence.

In analyses of other states active in Northeast Asia Chinese thinking emerged clearly in the first years of the 2020s. As in the case of Russia, which was obsessed with rebuilding the “Russian world,” under the sway of historical memory and an unshakable opposition to signs of Westernization in its assumed sphere of control, including Ukraine, China has also proceeded through stages in its responses to the West and the US role in Northeast Asia. It cannot accept South Korea (Westernized and defiant of China’s natural sphere of control) or even Japan as an equal sovereign state. Neither is recognized as a great power or a center of civilization, putting them in the position of Ukraine unworthy of standing in the way of the neighbor great power. For Russia to stand up to the West for its rightful status required a boost in self-confidence and a weakening of the West, not so much behavioral affronts from the United States apart from support for the tilt within Ukraine away from Russia. Similarly, the tilt in Seoul and even more in Tokyo away from Beijing suffices to create a confrontational atmosphere. Yet, Moscow’s belligerence to the West is not wholly endorsed. Warning that it overestimated the speed of multipolarization and underestimated the capacity of the US and its allies to prop up the existing international order, some approved of Russia’s reasoning but not its timing in 2022. In this way, they justified similar Chinese reasoning on Northeast Asia, adding a dollop of patience on timing.

Compared to 2013 through 2020, from 2021 Chinese tolerance had dropped toward policies in the United States, Japan, and South Korea related to geopolitics in Northeast Asia. Nothing the US did garnered approval, whether toward China, Russia, or North Korea. US efforts to steer ties to Japan and South Korea were invariably condemned as “Cold War” thinking. Behavior once seen as warranting cooperation or at least some understanding with the US and its allies now elicited only vitriol as a threat to China’s agenda for regional security. A downward spiral ensued as Biden’s arrival in 2021 reverberated in greater negativity to Japan and South Korea, followed by harsher criticism of all three in 2022 over their responses to the Russian aggression linked to possible Chinese aggression in Asia. The atmosphere in 2023 not only did not improve, but it also slipped another notch when Xi Jinping rebuffed Biden’s overtures and put more pressure on US allies. If 2024 brought a slight reprieve for obvious economic reasons, no course correction had occurred. By spring, China’s leaders were boldly issuing an ultimatum to the United States: stabilize ties (on regional and economic security) or face the consequences of a downward spiral or even conflict.

No other country in Northeast Asia joined China in the BRI, complicating pursuit of Sinocentrism. Putin was the honored guest at BRI conferences, but Russia kept its distance. In the 2020s, new pressure was put on South Korea to join, just as its economic “de-risking” was being targeted. If the BRI proved to be a reach, then a CJK FTA offered the next best thing. The fact that in May 2024 a CJK summit could proceed (after a five-year hiatus) at China’s urging proved that China’s quest for economic integration continued, even if relations with US allies faced new troubles. In the case of Sino-Russian relations, wartime sanctions gave the biggest boost to such integration.

If economic integration fell short of China’s desires, a monopoly over commerce excluding all main rivals was the next best thing. This existed for North Korea and was coming into view for Russian purchases of key industrial items. By default, the socialist legacy triangle came into sight. In contrast, hope was lost for the Confucian legacy triangle. It had centered on South Korea, the country whose rejection of a three-decade trajectory of rebalancing toward Sinocentrism stung the most. Expectations for Japan had been much lower. No wonder, Chinese writings about the
“loss” of South Korea are tinged with regret and occasional, desperate hopes for a reversal. The failure of Sinocentrism in South Korea had become a centerpiece of China’s coverage in 2021-24.

Danielle F. S. Cohen, “China’s Relations with Asia’s Southern Tier, 2021-2024”  

Four key themes characterized Chinese analysis of India during 2021–2024. The first was India’s view of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad, which led to a key debate: Was India aligning with the United States or was India pursuing a strategy of strategic autonomy and “multi-alignment”? The second theme, building on the first, was India’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean. Unsurprisingly, given the context, a third theme was India’s border policy. Finally, Chinese analysts evaluated the implications of Indian policy for core Chinese interests, including the BRI and the South China Sea, as well as for its self-proclaimed leadership of the Global South.

Between 2021 and 2024, two major factors provided the context for China–India relations. At the regional level, the key factor was the institutionalization of the Quad, characterized by the regularization of meetings among the four countries’ leaders and the expansion of the scope of issues they considered. Chinese analysts saw the institutionalization of the Quad as a manifestation of a US shift toward minilateralism—as opposed to more traditional multilateralism—which was also evident in the 2021 creation of AUKUS among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and continued intelligence sharing among the Five Eyes (the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada).

While the revival of the Quad began under the Trump administration, US minilateralism took on a different meaning in the context of the Biden administration, which embedded it in a broader strategy of creating an alliance of like-minded democracies. This US emphasis on minilateralism was itself driven by China–US competition in the Indo-Pacific. To the surprise of many Chinese analysts, who had expected a Biden administration to ease tensions in China–US relations, the Biden administration continued the Trump administration’s emphasis on an Indo-Pacific strategy and its general positioning of China as the United States’ key competitor. This underlying US–China competition was the backdrop for individual countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies, all of which complicated China’s strategic picture.

As Quad relations strengthened, India’s relations with the various Quad members continued to develop as well. In 2021, Australia, India, and Japan launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative in response to supply chain disruptions and concerns about overdependence on China laid bare by the Covid-19 pandemic. India held 2+2 dialogues with the United States (in 2022 and 2023), Japan (2022), and, for the first time, with Australia (in 2021, followed by a second 2+2 in 2023). In September 2022, Modi traveled to Japan for Abe’s funeral (joining Albanese and US Vice President Kamala Harris). In May 2023, Modi turned the cancelled Quad summit in Australia into an opportunity for an official visit hosted by Albanese. In June 2023, India and the United States announced a Roadmap for U.S.–India Defense Industrial Cooperation ahead of Modi’s state visit to Washington, DC; later that year, the two countries signed a five-year master ship repair agreement. Taken together, these developments suggested the development of India’s ties with each of the members of the Quad as well as its more active participation in the Quad mechanism itself.

At the bilateral level, the key factor was the resurgence of border tensions between China and India, brought to the forefront by the violence in the Galwan Valley in 2020, which set the tone for a very challenging relationship. Despite regular border talks, border tensions continued throughout this period. Indian analysts and officials expressed suspicions about what they saw as Chinese efforts to keep tensions going, pointing to geopolitics (as China and India jockeyed for regional influence), alleging a Chinese effort to knock down Indian ambitions, suggesting that China hoped to keep the Indian military tied up on a land border so India could not focus on expanding its maritime power, and highlighting Chinese concerns over Tibet. India insisted that China pull back its troops at the border as a precondition for normalizing relations. China urged India not to allow the border issue to define the two countries’ bilateral relationship and argued that China and India should work together to promote a multipolar world, regional stability, and their shared development. Meanwhile, both countries tried to change the demographic facts on the ground, through India’s “Vibrant Villages Programme” and China’s construction of hundreds of xiaokang villages in Tibet along the LAC.

Despite these years of tension, in a rare media interview in April 2024, Modi stressed the importance of peaceful China–India relations and emphasized the need to “urgently address” the border issue so that the bilateral relationship could be normalized. On July 4, Jaishankar and Wang met in Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the SCO and agreed to more intensive border talks. Later that month, they met again in Laos on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting and agreed “to work with purpose and urgency to achieve complete disengagement” along their disputed border. Taken together, these developments indicated that both countries were prioritizing the resolution of the border issue and suggested that both countries were interested in resuming friendlier relations after several difficult years.