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Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic constitutes a challenge to all Arctic NATO member states. Nevertheless, so far national defense priorities do not reflect that the Arctic is undergoing strategic normalization as Moscow continues its economic development and military buildup assisted by Chinese economic and technological assets. The limited defense budgets of NATO’s Arctic member states make it difficult to meet the demand for military armament in a region where extreme weather conditions and vast distances require specialized equipment and forces. The 2024 US Department of Defense Arctic Strategy recognizes the need for better monitoring, deterrence against Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation, and cooperation between NATO’s Arctic allies to acquire capabilities that strengthen the regional force posture of trans-Atlantic allies.1 The coming years will show if the United States and its Arctic allies manage to close the gaps in NATO defenses and establish credible deterrence of Russia and China.
Russia and China’s Overlapping Arctic Interests
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has intensified Moscow’s Arctic dilemmas. Russia is considered a threat that can trigger NATOs Article Five collective security commitment, meaning that an attack against a member state is an attack on the alliance. Russia’s status as an adversary of NATO will almost certainly endure, incentivizing Moscow to redirect its economy away from Europe and North America towards Asia and the Global South. Russia focuses on strengthening cooperation with China. The strategic partners work on expanding Russia’s Arctic infrastructure, allowing them to capitalize on the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route.
The route constitutes Russia’s national maritime waterway from the Barents Sea near northern Norway in the west to the Bering Sea near the US coastline in Alaska in the east.2 At the western entrance to the Northern Sea route, most of Russia’s nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines are stationed. At the eastern entrance to the Northern Sea Route, Russia’s Pacific Fleet is headquartered. Melting sea ice makes the route increasingly viable for commerce. However, enhancing the commercial utility of Russia’s Arctic coastline also increases Russia’s strategic vulnerability.
China and Russia do not share geopolitical agendas. Russia predominantly uses hard and hybrid power and political influence to establish a strategic foothold from West Africa to the Middle East and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic. China predominantly uses economic and hybrid power and political influence to establish a strategic foothold in all the world’s regions. In contrast to Russia, the Arctic region is low on the Chinese list of priorities. North America, Europe, Asia, and the Global South all rank higher on the Chinese agenda. China has little interest in opening another flank towards the United States and its allies requiring major resources and attention. China has plenty of other hot spots that are much more important to Chinese interests, such as the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China seas, Central Asia, South Asia, and the South Pacific, just to mention some of the regions giving rise to security challenges seen from Beijing’s perspective.
Unaccustomed to using hard power for international conflict resolution and faced with a corruption-ridden People’s Liberation Army, China lacks the warfighting experience and the internal organization to rely on the use of hard power as a means of influence in areas far from China’s home region. Indeed, Beijing praises itself for its economic growth and development focus as key to its global influence in the post-Cold War international system.
Instead of direct participation in Arctic militarization efforts likely to increase the number of security challenges China is facing, it has a major interest in investing economically and technologically in Russia’s Arctic region. Russian-Chinese Arctic cooperation benefits China economically and helps to ensure that Russia continues to pose a hard power threat to the United States and its Arctic allies. This strategy aims at taking some of the heat off Beijing’s numerous security challenges closer to home and profit from cooperating with Moscow on resource extraction and infrastructure development.
Russian-Chinese Cooperation on Energy, Shipping and Hard and Soft Infrastructure in the Arctic
Russia’s Arctic strategy for 2020-35 sets the priorities of developing oil and gas resources, improving living conditions to attract qualified labor, establishing the Northern Sea Route for commercial shipping, rebuilding a military presence to protect the country’s Arctic territory and maritime space, and protecting the region’s ecological balance.3 Russia’s Arctic objectives are interdependent. They require considerable investments in economic and technological infrastructure to be realized. Russia lacks the resources for such investments.4
Russian and Chinese interests converge around developing Arctic oil and gas resources and developing the shipping potential of the Northern Sea Route. China invests in turning the port of Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East into a transshipment point for Northeast China to connect to the rest of the country. China has also driven a hard energy bargain, enlisting cheap Russian oil and gas resources in the pursuit of Chinese objectives of economic growth and military-strategic expansion in the Indo-Pacific.5
The Northern Sea Route may be ice-free two to three summer months by the middle of this century. Still, container ships will need icebreaker assistance for the next twenty years, which is costly and will keep container traffic on the Northern Sea Route at modest levels for now.6 Nevertheless, the route is already key to Russian marine traffic and cargo such as mineral and energy resources. China is Russia’s biggest export destination. Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and was subjected to severe Western sanctions, the two countries have increased bilateral trade rapidly. Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated bilateral trade as Russia and China begin to decouple from the West to decrease strategic dependency on Europe and North America.
The Northern Sea Route allows Russia and China to bypass other countries when trading in strategic resources. Russia and China have established a committee tasked with planning how to increase container traffic along the route. In 2024, a joint venture was announced between Russia’s Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM and the Chinese shipping company Hainan Yangpu NewNew Shipping to cooperate on operating a container route all year round. The agreement involves building five ice-class container ships and investing in infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route to overcome the logistical challenges of operating an all-year container route.7
Chinese participation in Russian energy development secures Beijing access to sparse resources and allows it to avoid areas with security risks such as the Persian Gulf.8 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is currently the main driver of growing shipping traffic on the Northern Sea Route. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China’s Silk Road Fund hold a 30 per cent stake in the first phase of Russia’s LNG project in Yamal. The CNPC and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) together have a 20 per cent stake in the second phase of the Arctic LNG project operating from 2023 on the Gydan Peninsula.9 In June 2019, Russia and China signed an agreement to develop the Payakha oilfield on the Taymyr Peninsula, which houses one of the largest Arctic oil storage facilities and includes a crude-oil port capable of handling 50 million tons per year. China National Chemical Engineering No. 7 Construction Company is the main contractor on the project, which is part of what China calls the Polar Silk Road.10
China is connecting the Northern Sea Route to its Polar Silk Road, announced in January 2018.11 Today, ports, railways and roads connect Russia and China in a dense network which is gradually expanded. This includes cooperation on expanding the Russian port Zarubino southwest of Vladivostok close to the border with China. The objective is to build the biggest port in Northeast Asia with capacity to handle 60 million tons of goods annually. The port is connected directly to the Chinese mainland by rail.
China is also helping Russia to digitalize the Northern Sea Route. Built in Russia with Chinese optical fiber, the Polar Express undersea cable is expected to provide internet to all of Russia’s Arctic region by 2026. The 12,650 kilometer, exclusively state-funded cable will stretch along the Northern Sea Route from Teriberka on the Barents Sea to Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East. It is operated by the Russian state-owned company Morsviazsputnik.12
China’s polar satellites allow it to track shipping routes and monitor sea-ice movements. Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy, and mining projects across the Arctic – in Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States – provide Beijing with dual-use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Data gleaned and shared by China would enhance Russia’s situational awareness in the Arctic.13 In addition, Russian Gazprom’s space system subsidiary is developing the Polar Star satellite to provide broadband in the Arctic with a particular view to Russia’s situational awareness regarding events such as sea-ice movements and transits by foreign entities.14 However, China satellite coverage in the Arctic has surpassed that of Russia, increasing Russian dependency on Chinese data on Arctic activities.
Russian-Chinese Arctic cooperation on energy, shipping, and hard and soft infrastructure have dual use purposes. Not only does cooperation allow Moscow and Beijing to extract economic gains from developing Russia’s Arctic region, but it also helps them to develop their ability to operate in the Arctic region in all domains, enhance situational awareness, and strengthen their ability to project power across the region. Almost all activities are dual use. For example, space capabilities can be used to monitor adversaries’ military installations, and container and search and rescue vessels can carry weapons systems and be used for sabotage against sea cables.
Russia’s Militarization of the Arctic Region with Chinese Contributions
Russia’s defense force posture gives high priority to protecting its ballistic missile submarines, which allows it a second-strike nuclear capability and hence a credible threat to US territory. Most of Russia’s strategic submarine force is located at naval bases on Russia’s Kola peninsula near the Norwegian border. The Barents Sea constitutes the entry and exit points to the Kola peninsula from the Northern Sea Route. Supported by a dense network of air defense, aviation, and ground forces at Russia’s Northern Fleet bases, Russia has focused on closing off access as traffic increases on the sea route to protect its strategic submarine force and to preserve year-round access to the Atlantic. Distance and climate limit its reach into the Arctic. Russia has modernized the Nagurskoye airfield on the Franz Josef Land archipelago, deployed multiple surface-to-air missiles and radar units, and authorized commanders to plan and carry out interception operations. These efforts enhance its multi-domain awareness and power projection capability and consolidate a bastion strategy for protecting Russia’s ballistic missile submarines.15 Russia has also invested heavily in precision-guided missile technology, enabling it to threaten distant targets and achieve sea denial without deploying traditional naval or air forces.
Russia’s Pacific fleet is headquartered in the Vladivostok area, south of the Bering Sea at the eastern entrance to the Northern Sea Route. Here, Russia has hardened its submarine bases. Its efforts include increasing missile and torpedo stocks and constructing new hardened submarine shelter pens and repair and maintenance facilities to avoid dependency on Northern Fleet facilities at the other end of Eurasia.
As climate change facilitates increased maritime traffic, Moscow feels increasingly vulnerable because of the challenges to maintaining control and protecting its strategic assets against hostile actors. Russia and China have developed hybrid warfare capabilities, including submarines and fishing trawlers, for undersea operations to disrupt foreign Arctic economies. The network of underwater cables and pipes on which communications and data transmission between North America and European countries depend were not built to withstand hybrid warfare. NATO member states patrol Arctic underwater infrastructure with submarines, uncrewed underwater vehicles, and other capabilities. Nevertheless, it is impossible to offer sufficient protection of every cable and hence to prevent sabotage.
The Norwegian island Svalbard at the border of the Barents Sea has experienced cable incidents. For example, in 2021 cables of an underwater monitoring network which can detect submarines were cut, and in 2022 an undersea cable connecting a satellite ground station to the Norwegian mainland was severed. Also in 2022, the undersea cable linking the Faroe Islands in the North Atlantic Ocean to Scotland via the Shetland and Orkney Islands was damaged twice and communication was cut off.16 Hybrid warfare threatens mission-critical communication and exchange of data between NATO’s Arctic member states.
Russian and NATO airfields, military bases, and coastguard facilities in the Arctic are in relative proximity.17 Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has built more than 475 structures in the Arctic. Russia operates seven nuclear-powered icebreakers and 34 diesel-powered icebreakers.18 Russia conducts extensive military exercises in the Arctic from the Pacific to the North Atlantic. Ships from the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the Russian Navy have operated together off the coast of Alaska in international waters since 2022.19 The exercises are not merely intended to test and improve the performance of the participants’ armed forces. They also strengthen deterrence by demonstrating capabilities, interoperability, and preparedness.
The evolving Arctic strategic competition with NATO member states creates incentives for Russia to engage in closer cooperation with China, focusing on economic and technological cooperation and sharing of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information rather than a direct military role for China. China operates four polar research vessels in the Arctic, three of which are icebreakers. China has announced construction of a domestically built nuclear-powered icebreaker.20 Research expeditions have been used to test equipment such as unmanned underwater vehicles and fixed-wing polar-capable aircraft. The polar research vessels are also critical for establishing situational awareness. China is also building semi-submersible heavy-lift ships that facilitate salvage operations and transport of exceptionally heavy cargoes.
If China demanded its own repair and replenishment facilities in Russia’s Arctic ports, China’s transport and surveillance polar capabilities would allow it to operate commercially and militarily across the Northern Sea Route, using its own escort ships. However, China is not challenging Russia’s concern to maintain control of its Arctic maritime waterway. Instead, China cooperates closely with Russia in the region to facilitate continued Russian strategic dominance of its Arctic region. Notwithstanding the short-term practical synergies and collaboration between Russia and China in the Arctic, however, questions remain about the extent to which Russian and Chinese interests align in the Arctic in the long term. It is unclear whether Russia would be willing to tolerate more robust military Chinese activity in the region. In five to ten years, China will most likely be able to transit the Northern Sea Route from east to west with near silent ballistic missile submarines. As Russian-Chinese relations with the US and its allies continue to deteriorate, strategic collaboration between Moscow and Beijing is likely to intensify, and China may take on a stronger force posture in the Arctic region.
NATO’s Response to Strategic Normalization of the Arctic Region
How are NATO’s Arctic member states positioned to match the growing Russian-Chinese strategic presence in the Arctic and provide credible deterrence of Russia and China? In principle, they dominate the region with more advanced economic, technological, and military resources. Since 2014, NATO has enhanced its strategic reach, readiness, and deterrence in the Arctic. The US has prioritized protecting freedom of navigation and coordination with its European allies, and deployed additional troops and equipment, especially in Norway and Iceland. In addition, NATO has increased its exercise and training tempo, enhanced its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and strengthened intelligence-sharing among allies and partners.21
Nevertheless, when compared to Russia’s militarization of and collaboration with China in the Arctic, the region has been neglected by the US and its NATO allies. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO countries thought that Russia would be too preoccupied in Ukraine to develop its economic and military presence in the Arctic.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has burdened the Russian economy, including its Arctic projects. The target deadlines of many projects have been postponed. However, Arctic energy resources and military-strategic control along the Northern Sea Route is too significant for Russia’s economic development and its geopolitical influence to relinquish its Arctic development plans. The economic and strategic importance of the Arctic has prompted Moscow to align its regional agenda more closely with Chinese interests to attract more resources and collaboration from Beijing. Officially, some Chinese companies have withdrawn from some Arctic projects because of Western sanctions, such as the LNG-2 project. However, hybrid activities such as grey-zone vessels transporting energy resources from Russia to China and continued export of dual-use components from China to Russia that can be used for military purposes are frequently detected. And China still plays a major economic role in the LNG-2 project. Russian and Chinese interests in circumventing sanctions to strengthen their Arctic cooperation trump concern about the consequences of breaching sanctions. This has allowed Moscow to continue to strengthen its economic engagements, technological development efforts and defense posture in the region, although at a slower pace than before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.22
NATO has been slow to recognize that the Arctic has developed into an area of security and defense concerns, writing off Russia’s gradual military build-up as necessary for patrolling its increasingly busy territorial waters and protecting its legal claims to the seabed. The High North was not mentioned in the alliance’s summit communiqués until the 2021 Brussels Summit. Even then, NATO agreed merely to continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the alliance’s security interests in the High North.23 NATOs 2024 summit communiqué merely states that the historic accession of Finland and Sweden makes them safer and our alliance stronger, including in the High North.24 Like the term “North Atlantic,” which loosely encompasses the ice-free part of the Arctic, “High North” is a somewhat nebulous political concept.25 By using the term, NATO avoided committing to the security of a particular geographical area. This reflects intra-alliance disagreement on the role of NATO in the Arctic and hence the absence of a NATO strategy for the region.
Among NATO member states with coastlines on the Arctic Ocean, Canada has been the most critical of alliance engagement in the Arctic. Ottawa has shared the Russian view that, as Arctic coastal states, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US have territorial and maritime rights and obligations that entitle them to a special role in Arctic governance. Both Canada and Russia, however, claim exclusive rights over the sea routes that would traverse through waters adjacent to their coastline, the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, respectively.
Canada’s position is that, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters. Under the same UNCLOS provision, Russia asserts the right to administer the Northern Sea Route as an ice-covered area and regards the route as internal waters. The United States challenges both positions, arguing that the two passages are straits through which states enjoy transit rights.26
If NATO became recognized as an institution with legitimate Arctic interests, it would be harder for Canada to sustain the argument of special territorial and maritime rights and obligations. But NATO is unlikely to be able to agree on a unified approach to the Arctic any time soon. Nevertheless, the alliance is playing a de facto role in the Arctic by virtue of its defense commitments to Arctic member states. In addition, NATO’s political status as a North Atlantic alliance legitimizes its protection of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and the Scandinavian coastline, which together constitute the supply route between North America and Northern Europe and are situated in ice-free parts of the Arctic.
As an Arctic power and a potential target of Russia’s nuclear posture in the Arctic, the United States published a new defense strategy for the Arctic twelve days after the 2024 NATO summit, signaling that although the alliance does not have an Arctic strategy, Washington is determined to make it a priority for the Arctic NATO member states. The US Department of Defense emphasizes the need for effective oversight over activity in the region through strengthened monitoring and enhanced allied cooperation to establish credible deterrence of Russia and China.27
To counter Russian and Chinese influence, at the NATO summit the US announced agreement on an ice pact among it, Canada, and Finland. Both the US and Canada have allocated resources to invest in new icebreakers.28 This is just the beginning of allied cooperation to provide credible deterrence in the Arctic region, if the US has its way. The ice pact demonstrates that allied cooperation on establishing credible deterrence trumps different views on the rights and obligations of Arctic coastal states.
Another priority is to strengthen monitoring of activities in the Arctic. Satellites and unmanned systems play a key role in this part of the US strategy. In the space domain, the US has allocated resources to upgrade the Pituffik Space Base in northwest Greenland. In addition, new missile warning and tracking and communications and weather satellites are on the agenda. However, polar specific systems are required for adequate coverage, requiring research, development, and testing. This is also the case with another priority area: uncrewed systems designed for polar conditions and tasked with sensing missions and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The US Space Force has invested in overhead persistent infrared polar-orbit satellites for missile warning, and the Space Development Agency is putting many of its satellites in polar orbit. The US Air Force is working with commercial companies such as SpaceX and OneWeb to invest in polar coverage and field hybrid satellite communications terminals for commercial companies to access multiple satellite constellations in polar orbit.29
Norway is an important cooperation partner in the space domain. The US Department of Defense is working with Oslo to put a communications payload on a Norwegian satellite scheduled to be launched soon. It also recognizes a need for more ground stations to create redundancy regarding communication assets that are critical for the national security of NATO’s Arctic member states. Norway and the United States may therefore host additional ground stations in the future.
As Russia and China step up their military exercises and activities in the Pacific in and near the Bering Sea, the Bering Strait has become a critical choke point on a par with the Barents Sea near northern Norway. Within a decade, China is likely to transit the strait with near silent ballistic missile submarines. A stronger monitoring network by means of fiber-optic acoustic sensors in locations such as St. Lawrence Island and Svalbard to detect submarine traffic and other transits would help NATO allies improve their situational awareness. Secure communications infrastructure across the Arctic is essential to safeguard maritime transportation routes and protect critical assets from hybrid warfare.
Another focus area is maritime surface capabilities. Here, allied cooperation will also be essential. The US defense budget for the Arctic focuses on capabilities designed to protect the US homeland. Capabilities for defense and deterrence outside of US Arctic territory and maritime zone claims and US-controlled bases such as Pituffik Space Base in Greenland will most likely have to be paid for by other NATO allies.
The announcement at the NATO summit in Washington, D.C. in July 2024 of a trilateral Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) pact among the US, Canada, and Finland to build icebreakers and other polar capabilities for the Arctic region is an important first step to demonstrate allied defense industrial collaboration on upgrading the maritime deterrent of NATO’s Arctic allies. Finnish shipyards have built icebreaker hulls, primarily for Russia until its invasion of Ukraine when sanctions put a stop to the trade. The pact promises that Finnish and Canadian shipyards will have new customers from the NATO alliance. Both the US and Canada need new icebreakers. The US Coast Guard has announced that it needs eight to ten. Part of the ICE pact involves Canadian shipyards building two icebreakers in Vancouver and six in Quebec, and they may also be producing new US icebreakers in the future.30
The US has announced that they would host a roundtable to discuss how to strengthen allied cooperation in the Arctic,31 no doubt including which capabilities Norway and Denmark are to acquire to patrol the area from the Barents Sea to the GIUK Gap where Russian submarines transit, often without being detected. NATO’s Arctic supply lines between North America and northern Europe that run through the Bear gap between Svalbard and Scandinavia and the GIUK gap between Scotland and Greenland are crucial to deter Russia from attacking Europe. Russia is testing NATO defenses in this area, and they are often found wanting. And it is not just Russian submarines that transit without being detected. At regular intervals, Russian warships are intercepted as far down as Faroese waters without prior notification from Norwegian authorities.32
Insufficient communication and capabilities leave big gaps in NATO’s maritime Arctic defenses. Neither Norway nor Denmark has capacities such as ice-strengthened frigates with anti-air and helicopter-based anti-submarine equipment that can detect and pursue submarines and defend themselves. In 2024, Norway announced the acquisition of five new frigates and five submarines. Details of the frigates have not been disclosed, but it would be surprising if they are not equipped to hunt submarines. Denmark has yet to decide which ships to invest in. Greenland has demanded that Denmark invest in coastguard vessels. Greenland worries that warships will ramp up tension levels and leave the country in the middle of high-intensity conflict. On the other hand, warships capable of submarine hunting are a high priority for the US because it is a homeland security issue. The issue of surface vessel acquisition is therefore likely to be a central topic for discussion at the Arctic roundtable.
In addition, acquisition of unmanned underwater vehicles designed for the Arctic climate to ensure improved situational awareness and communication between allies is also likely to be a topic for roundtable discussion. All Arctic NATO countries have difficulties persuading defense and coastguard personnel to take up positions in the Arctic because of its remoteness and extreme weather conditions. It leads to frequent changeovers of staff and, as a result, many people on duty lack the training to perform key tasks. Unmanned vehicles can make a big difference to solve this issue. However, they require resources not only to acquire, but also to research, develop, and test equipment. And unmanned vehicles also require personnel with specialized skills to be operated. This adds significantly to the cost of these capabilities.
NATO’s inability to agree on an Arctic strategy means that NATO lacks Arctic-capable capacities. With so much focus on defense budgets of two percent as a minimum target that may soon be increased, all the Arctic NATO member states except for the US have difficulties justifying spending on capabilities that do not count as contributions to NATO capabilities targets. Another topic for the Arctic roundtable might be how to revise the capabilities targets so they acknowledge expensive investments in capabilities that are of central importance to North-Atlantic security.
Conclusion: Actions Speak Louder than Words
With Russian and Chinese Arctic dual use and military capabilities developing at a rapid clip, it is urgent for NATO’s Arctic allies to close the major gaps in their regional force posture. Direct threats to US homeland security make Washington determined to strengthen allied collaboration on acquiring the capabilities required to establish credible deterrence of Moscow and Beijing across the Arctic region. The ICE pact constitutes a promising beginning. However, the US and it allies still have a long list of security concerns requiring large investments to be addressed. Defense industrial cooperation based on assessments of which countries deliver the most capable and cheapest Arctic capacities for multidomain operations under extreme climatic conditions is the safest and fastest way to make NATO adequately prepared for a future of geostrategic normalization in the region. This is perhaps the most important issue to address at future roundtables between NATO’s Arctic allies.
1. U.S. Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy, July 22, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3846206/dod-announces-publication-of-2024-arctic-strategy/.
2. Under Russian law, the “Northern Sea Route” only runs to the Kara Sea, while the “Northeast Passage” runs to the Barents Sea and provides access to the port of Murmansk. Russia tends to use the Northern Sea Route designation, which is also used in this article. See Albert Buixadé Farré, et al., “Commercial Arctic Shipping Through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, and Infrastructure,” Polar Geography, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2014): 298-324.
3. ”Strategy for developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035,” October 26, 2020, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202010260033.
4. Post-Ukraine, environmental objectives are not likely to be high on the agenda of a cash-strapped Russia. And despite lip service, China probalby will not prioritize a common Arctic environmental agenda. Thus, environmental concerns are unlikely to drive Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic. See Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and China in the Arctic: Cooperation, Competition, and Consequences,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 31 March 2020, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/81407.
5. Gilbert Rozman, “Current Russia-China Partnership Dynamics,” in Regina Karp and Richard W. Maass, eds., Alliances and Partnerships in a Complex and Challenging Security Environment (Norfolk, VA: NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2024), p. 82.
6. See, for example, Lukas Wahden, ”In the Russian Arctic, China Treads on Thinning Ice,” LSE Blog, November 24, 2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/11/24/in-the-russian-arctic-china-treads-on-thinning-ice/.
7. ”Rusland og Kina vil drive helårs containerrute via Nordøstpassagen” [Russia and China will run all year container route along the Northern Sea Route], Søfart, June 7, 2024, https://www.soefart.dk/article/view/1103430/rusland-og-kina-vil-drive-helars-containerrute-via-nordostpassagen.
8. Atle Staalesen, ”Russia, China Step Up Talks over Arctic Shipping,” Independent Barents Observer, May 3, 2019, https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2019/04/30/china-russia-belt-road-initiative-putin-jinping/.
9. ”Russia: Launch of the Giant Arctic LNG 2 Development,” Total Energies, May 9, 2019, https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/russia-launch-giant-arctic-lng-2-development.
10. ”Payakha Oilfield Project,” ZAWYA, 24 March 2020.
11. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ”China’s Arctic Policy,” January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.
12. Gleb Solyarov, ”Russia Starts Operation to Lay Undersea Fiber-optic Cable Through Arctic,” Reuters, August 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/russia-starts-operation-lay-undersea-fibre-optic-cable-through-arctic-2021-08-06/.
13. Malte Humpert, ”Lacking Own Satellite Coverage Russia Is Looking to China For Northern Sea Route Data,” High North News, March 30, 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/lacking-own-satellite-coverage-russia-looking-china-northern-sea-route-data.
14. Claire Percival, ”Arktika-M No.2 Ι Soyuz 2.1b /Fregat-M,” Everyday Astronaut, December 14, 2023, https://everydayastronaut.com/arktika-m-no-2-soyuz-2-1b-fregat-m/.
15. Jonas Kjellén, ”The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 13, March 2022, pp. 34-52.
16. Malte Humpert, ”Fiber-optic Submarine Cable near Faroe and Shetland Islands Damaged; Mediterranean Cables also Cut,” High North News, October 24, 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cable-near-faroe-and-shetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut.
17. Christian Perez, ”How Russia’s Future with NATO Will Impact the Arctic,” Foreign Policy Insider, February 25, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/25/arctic-ukraine-russia-china-eu-invasion-nato/?fp_arctic_russia_nato_completed_form=1.
18. Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, ”Russia’s icebreaker fleet is the most powerful in the world,” February 20, 2024, https://mintrans.gov.ru/press-center/news/11115.
19. Ken Moriyasu, “U.S. to launch Arctic defense roundtable eyeing Russia, China,” Nikkei Asia, July 24, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/U.S.-to-launch-Arctic-defense-roundtable-eyeing-Russia-China.
20. Michael Wenger, “China starts construction of its third polar-going vessel, ” Polar Journal, June 29, 2023, https://polarjournal.ch/en/2023/06/29/china-starts-construction-of-its-third-icebreaker/; Trym Eiterjord, ”Checking Back in on China’s Nuclear Icebreaker,” The Diplomat, February 13, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/checking-back-in-on-chinas-nuclear-icebreaker/.
21. John J. Hamre and Heather A. Conley, ”The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and US Strategic Interests,” in John Andreas Olsen, ed., NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 54.
22. Nurlan Aliyev, ”Moscow’s Arctic Projects Amidst the War: Sanctions, LNG Projects, Icebreakers and the Northern Sea Route,” ISPI 90, Milano: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 25, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/moscows-arctic-projects-amidst-the-war-sanctions-lng-projects-icebreakers-and-the-northern-sea-route-178452.
23. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ”Brussels Summit Communiqué,” June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
24. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Washington Summit Declaration,” Washington, D.C., July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?utm_source=multi&utm_medium=smc&utm_campaign=100724%26summit%26washington.
25. Odd Gunnar Skagestad, ”The ’High North’: An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy,” FNI Report 10/2020, August 2010, https://www.fmi.no/getfile.php/131978-1469869945/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1010.pdf.
26. M. Taylor Fravel, Kathryn Lavelle and Liselotte Odgaard, ”China Engages the Arctic: A Great Power in a Regime Complex,” Asian Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2022, p. 145.
27. U.S. Department of Defense, 2024 Arctic Strategy, July 22, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3846206/dod-announces-publication-of-2024-arctic-strategy/.
28. NATO Public Forum, Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair, NATO Military Committee, July 11, 2024.
29. U.S. Department of Defense, “Hicks Announces Defense Arctic Strategy,” defense.gov, July 22, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Videos/videoid/931283/; Greg Hadley, “Defense Leaders: We Need to Invest in Space, Unmanned Systems for the Arctic,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, July 23, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/defense-leaders-space-unmanned-arctic/.
30. Murray Brewster, ”Canada, U.S. and Finland form pact to build icebreakers for Arctic,” CBC News, July 11, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-us-finland-icebreakers-1.7260460.
31. Ken Moriyasu, “U.S. to launch Arctic defense roundtable eyeing Russia, China,” Nikkei Asia, July 24, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/U.S.-to-launch-Arctic-defense-roundtable-eyeing-Russia-China.
32. Anonymous interviews, with Arctic Command Denmark officers, August 2022.
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